Does Centralized Private Power Corrode the Rule of Law? by Wilson, James G.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship
1-2016
Does Centralized Private Power Corrode the Rule
of Law?
James G. Wilson
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, j.wilson@csuohio.edu
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
research.services@law.csuohio.edu.
Repository Citation
Wilson, James G., "Does Centralized Private Power Corrode the Rule of Law?" (2016). Law Faculty Articles and Essays. 831.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/831
 
 
 
157 
DOES CENTRALIZED PRIVATE POWER CORRODE 
THE RULE OF LAW? 
JAMES G. WILSON 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 157 
I.  DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF “PRIVATE POWER” ................................... 162 
 A.  Creating Centralized Power .......................................................... 162 
 B.  Reducing Centralized Power ......................................................... 163 
II.  DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE “RULE OF LAW” ................................ 165 
 A.  Traditional Positivist Conceptions of the  
  Rule of Law.................................................................................... 166 
 B.  A Blended Positivists Theory on the Rule of Law .......................... 168 
  1.  As-applied ............................................................................. 168 
  2.  Formal Equality .................................................................... 169 
 C.  A Natural Law Theory on the Rule of Law .................................... 170 
III.  “CORROSION” AND “CORRUPTION” ........................................................ 171 
 A.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence ....................................................... 172 
  1.  Buckley .................................................................................. 172 
  2.  Citizens United ...................................................................... 172 
 B.  Corruption, Corrosion, and the Rule of Law ................................. 172 
IV.  A BRIEF EMPIRICAL DISCUSSION OF HOW PRIVATE CENTRALIZED POWER IS 
UNDERMINING THE RULE OF LAW .......................................................... 174 
 A.  Private Banking ............................................................................. 174 
 B.  Subprime Loans ............................................................................. 175 
 C.  JP Morgan Chase .......................................................................... 177 
 D.  Corrosion and the Emergence of Crony, Corporate  
  Welfare .......................................................................................... 178 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 181 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Public reactions to major Supreme Court decisions are often unpredictable. Few 
people criticized the Court for protecting contraceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut,1 
but its subsequent decision in Roe v. Wade,2 safeguarding a woman’s choice to have 
an abortion, remains a major, divisive political issue. Similarly, most Americans 
remained indifferent when the Court invalidated congressional efforts to limit private 
                                                           
 Professor James Wilson is a Professor Emeritus of Law at the Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law. He received his B.A. from Princeton University and his J.D. from the University of 
Chicago. 
 1 381 U.S. 485 (1965). 
 2 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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money’s influence over political campaigns in Buckley v. Valeo3 and several 
supplemental opinions. However, the Court’s creation of a new First Amendment 
right, enabling corporations to spend unlimited amounts on favored politicians, in 
Citizens United v. FEC4 triggered widespread outrage across the political spectrum.5 
There have been many proposals either to overrule Citizens United or to limit its 
baleful effects. The accelerating cascade of polluting money continually reinforces 
this dissent. At a recent symposium sponsored by the Cleveland State Law Review, 
Professor Lawrence Lessig continued his campaign to implement a voucher system 
for political donations in which each citizen would receive a fixed amount of money 
to donate to any campaigner.6 Lessig claimed the citizenry would increase their 
collective influence over Congress without necessitating an overruling of Citizens 
United. Professor Eugene Mazo recommended that Congress change its internal 
ethical rules to reduce campaign spending.7 Professor Bruce Ledewitz proposed that 
Congress eliminate all caps on direct campaign donations to candidates, thereby 
increasing visibility of donors and diminishing the power of super PACs and other 
organizations that operate in the shadows.8 Others have proposed a constitutional 
amendment.9 Some believe that the Court should reverse itself. However, that hope 
leaves opponents of Citizens United in a stymied position: They must defeat the 
moneyed interests in several presidential and senatorial elections to gain an enduring 
majority on the Court. Most politicians from both parties line up at various watering 
holes favored by the plutocracy—the Hamptons, Hollywood, Houston, or Las 
Vegas—to obtain sufficient campaign donations to defeat or deter opponents. These 
wealthy donors winnow politicians in the “green primary” long before the average 
citizen votes.10  
This Essay takes a different perspective on the relationship between money and 
politics to argue that the current political economy has become pervasively corroded. 
Eliminating the Buckley line of cases—including Citizens United—is a necessary but 
                                                           
 3 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 4 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 5 In a 2012 poll, seventy-four percent of Republicans agreed with the statement that the 
decision would “lead to corruption. Only fifteen percent disagreed. The Conservative Case for 
Overturning Citizens United, DEMOCRACY IS FOR PEOPLE: A PUBLIC CITIZEN PROJECT, 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Conservative-Talking-Points.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 
2016).   
 6 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS – AND 
A PLAN TO STOP IT 273 (2011). 
 7 Professor Mazo argued, as he does elsewhere, that these internal ethics rules would 
preclude court involvement under the “political question” doctrine. See Eugene D. Mazo, The 
Disappearance of Corruption and the New Path Forward in Campaign Finance, 9 DUKE J. 
CONST. L.AW & PUB. POL’Y 259, 293 (2014). 
 8 See Bruce Ledewitz, The Threat of Independent Political Spending to Democratic 
Life—And a Plan to Stop It, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133 (2016).  
 9 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 11, 113th Cong. (2013); H.J. Res. 10, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 10 See Fredreka Schouten & Gregory Korte, A Few Wealthy Donors Fuel Super PACs, USA TODAY 
(last updated May 3, 2012, 12:40 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-04-
25/super-PAC-donations/54660672/1. 
2http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/6
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insufficient step to enable the nation to achieve and sustain a humane republican 
society. Quite simply, private power has become too unified and too powerful. Large 
corporations routinely extract wealth from local communities by threatening to move 
operations elsewhere.11 The corporate media’s propaganda campaign begins with 
constitutionally protected advertising aimed at turning children into compulsive 
consumers and culminates with a faux debate between two political parties that have 
served the same economic special interests. Major corporations band together, 
funding the Chamber of Commerce’s pro-business litigation strategy12 and the 
American Legislative Exchange Council’s (“ALEC”) efforts to gut public power at 
the state level.13 There is no quick campaign finance fix; for example, in other 
nations, such as England, private banks exert great power even though there is a 
strict limit on the amount candidates can spend.14   
Any social reform, such as expanded health care, requires vast rent payments to 
private corporations. The country is unable to consider, much less resolve 
innumerable serious problems: environmental degradation, increased wealth 
inequality, resource depletion, continuing racial inequalities, degraded infrastructure, 
and so forth. In other words, America’s challenges extend far beyond the Court’s 
campaign finance doctrine. This class-based imbalance long predates Buckley, much 
less Citizens United. For well over a century, the United States has consistently 
lagged behind other developed countries in providing basic benefits to its citizenry.15 
At one time, the nation’s exceptional economic growth ameliorated the problem, 
because for many, America was a land ripe with opportunity for the middle-class. 
But now, there is less upward mobility in this country than in most other 
economically advanced nations;16 elsewhere, students pay little for tuition, while 
American youth are overwhelmed with debt.17 The following nine charts verify the 
                                                           
 11 See Thomas L. Evans, The Taxation of Nonshareholder Contributions to Capital: An 
Economic Analysis, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1468-69 (1992) (discussing how corporations can 
threaten to move their facilities from one locale to another). 
 12 The “U.S.” Chamber of Commerce is spreading its venomous version of deregulation 
throughout the world. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Works Globally to 
Fight Antismoking Measures, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/business/international/us-chamber-works-globally-to-
fight-antismoking-measures.html. 
 13 See Allison Boldt, Rhetoric vs. Reality: ALEC’s Disguise as a Nonprofit Despite its 
Extensive Lobbying, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 35, 36 (2012) (discussing the operations 
and influence of ALEC). 
 14 See Paul Waldman, How Our Campaign Finance System Compares to Other Countries, 
AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 4, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/how-our-campaign-finance-system-
compares-other-countries. 
 15 See generally Irwin Garfinkel & Timothy Smeeding, Wealth and Welfare States: What 
is the Real Story?, INST. FOR RES. ON POVERTY (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp138710.pdf. 
 16 Elise Gould, U.S. Lags Behind Peer Countries in Mobility, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 10, 
2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/usa-lags-peer-countries-mobility. 
 17 Astra Taylor & Hannah Appel, American Education Is Leaving Our Youth with a Debt 
Sentence, THE NATION (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/american-
education-leaving-our-youth-debt-sentence. 
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accelerating decline of the middle class, a development obscured by bipartisan 
manipulation of such better-known measurements as inflation, unemployment, and 
GNP.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is doubtful that the judiciary can do enough by itself to address these 
fundamental issues, even if a new Supreme Court majority overruled Citizens 
United. Most courts have ignored corruption, because they cannot easily define the 
concept and/or do not want to monitor closely the more openly political branches.19 
Potentially potent legal doctrines, such as public trust or anti-lobbying provisions, 
have had little practical effect.20 Even if judges were motivated to reinterpret or 
change the law they remain beholden to lax prosecutorial discretion to hear a case.21 
In other words, legal experts cannot successfully reform the underlying structural, 
economic, and political imbalances by manufacturing clever doctrine within the 
                                                           
 18 Tyler Durden, Obama’s Recovery in Just 9 Charts, ZERO HEDGE (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-09-16/obamas-recovery-just-9-charts. 
 19 See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF 
BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 195-204 (2014). Professor Teachout described problems American 
courts encounter when regulating the often-disturbing relationships between public and 
private power. See id. at 195. 
 20 See id. at 144-169. 
 21 See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives 
Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions.  
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judicial system.22 The citizenry must reconsider the overall direction of the country, 
putting pressure on all three branches to revive an imperiled middle class republic. 
To verify this Essay’s accusation of systemic corrosion, we shall examine the 
question raised in this Essay’s title: Does centralized private power corrode the rule 
of law? The basic argument, which can be traced back to ancient Greece, is that 
profound wealth inequality invariably creates an unstable, dual legal system.23 The 
rich become largely immune from criminal sanctions, civil regulations, and taxation; 
the middle class carries the tax burden while the criminal justice system hammers the 
poor.24 This perpetuates the fear of the Framers that America would decline if it ever 
adopted a class system similar to the European class structure, which was far more 
drastic.25   
The infamous revolving door between the corridors of public and private power 
guarantees regulatory capture; high-level bureaucrats, members of Congress, and 
military leaders flock to the private sector, where they are fulsomely rewarded for 
past and future services (an inspiration for leaders still travailing in the public 
sector). The most dramatic recent example was former Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Ben Bernanke’s transition to an “advisor” to the giant hedge fund 
Citadel.26 Bernanke claimed there was no “appearance of corruption,” because the 
Federal Reserve Bank did not regulate Citadel and he would not be lobbying.27 
However, the Federal Reserve has done far more than regulate parts of the economy; 
it doled out trillions in direct and indirect subsidies28  to all major players, including 
Citadel, to prop up stock prices.29 Furthermore the lobbying rules are a farce, 
inapplicable to the most influential private players in Washington and New York.30 
These legal double standards are signifiers of social corruption and moral decline. 
                                                           
 22 See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
341, 397-98 (2009) (discussing how the Court is currently ahistorical and adrift when it comes 
to corruption). 
 23 “Wealth is skilled at entering all places, sacred and profane, where a poor man, even if 
he entered, would not obtain his wish.” Sophocles, Aleadae, in EARLY GREEK POLITICAL 
THOUGHT FROM HOMER TO THE SOPHISTS 53 (Michael Gagarin & Paul Woodruff, eds., trans., 
1995) (fragment). 
 24 See, e.g., MATT TAIBBI, THE DIVIDE: AMERICAN INJUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE WEALTH 
GAP 399-400 (2014). 
 25 See Jeffrey Bergner, Europe is No Model: The Genius of American Politics, WKLY. 
STANDARD (May 17, 2010), http://www.weeklystandard.com/europe-is-no-
model/article/439457. 
 26 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Alexandra Stevenson, Ben Bernanke Will Work With Citadel, a 
Hedge Fund, as an Adviser, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/business/ben-bernanke-will-work-with-citadel-a-hedge-
fund-as-an-adviser.html?_r=0. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Press Release, Senator Bernie Sanders, The Fed Audit (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/the-fed-audit. 
 29 Josh Zumbrun, How Citadel and the Fed Crossed Paths Before the Hedge Fund Hired 
Ben Bernanke, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/04/16/how-
citadel-and-the-fed-crossed-paths-before-the-hedge-fund-hired-ben-bernanke. 
 30 TEACHOUT, supra note 19, at 169-70. 
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This Essay proposes a useful set of definitions of crucial concepts containing 
multiple meanings and then applies those concepts to a few examples.  The next Part 
of this Essay explores different conceptions of “private power.” Part II evaluates 
different theories of the “rule of law,” analyzing their strengths and inadequacies. 
Part III develops the terms “corrosion” and “corruption,” explaining how and why 
the Court erred in Citizens United by creating an untraditional definition of 
“corruption” that reduced this fundamental threat to republican norms and 
institutions to the rarely enforced crime of bribery. The Essay employs the term 
“corrosion” instead of “corruption” to escape the permutations and emanations of the 
Court’s constricted “corruption” doctrine. A broader conception of “corrosion” also 
reminds us how and why our problems run much deeper than competing 
interpretations of the First Amendment. Finally, Part IV provides specific examples 
of legal and market corrosion, caused by centralized private power’s evasion of the 
rule of law.31  
I. DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF “PRIVATE POWER” 
Crucial legal and political concepts, such as equality, property, power, or rule of 
law, have numerous meanings. Virtually all are enlightening in different situations. 
First, we need to find the particular definitions that best clarify the social problem 
being explored. Next, we should avoid the cheap rhetorical move of seizing upon 
syllogistic definitions, masquerading as sociological arguments, which eliminate the 
underlying cultural conflicts or evade powerful counterarguments. Highly abstract 
arguments create the impression that these problems are an exercise in formal logic 
instead of a moral inquiry.   
If one agrees with Aristotle that middle-class republics are best suited to preserve 
a community and provide the opportunity for most individuals to pursue happiness,32 
some modes of private economic power are desirable.33 People should be able to 
accumulate significant but not overwhelming wealth. They should be encouraged to 
own a home, obtain limited personal goods, fund their retirement, and create small 
businesses that can expand.  
A. Creating Centralized Power 
It is not easy to balance private and public power. The corporate form has proved 
useful in allowing peoples and societies to grow and accumulate wealth. State-
granted immunities enable numerous private parties to combine capital to pursue 
riskier ventures.  But it does not follow that corporations are entitled to extensive 
constitutional rights. Investors and managers should take the “bitter with the sweet” 
after benefitting from the state-created subsidy of personal immunity from most 
                                                           
 31 This short Essay cannot be definitive. Often, the first step is to ask an interesting 
question requiring an empirical answer. The best way to refute this Essay’s charge of 
pervasive legal corrosion is to demonstrate that the public and private ruling classes are 
improving the nation and the planet for every person and most other beings, not primarily for 
themselves. 
 32 Defined as enjoying “a life of excellence without impediment.” 2 ARISTOTLE, THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 2056 (Jonathan Barnes 
ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1984).  
 33 Id. at 2057. 
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litigation. States should be able to condition corporate charters, precluding most 
corporations from directly participating in the public electoral process.34 
When corporations become extremely large, they frequently control the 
particular market that previously limited their power through the dynamics of 
competition. Once they have enough wealth and market-share, they can pressure 
politicians to create a compliant regulatory system, which has enough rules to deter 
small competitors but not enough constraints to preclude massive profits and 
bonuses.35 Economic power is also political power. While Karl Marx tragically 
misled generations by proposing armed revolutions, led by a small elite to create a 
“communist” society with no private power, he accurately described capitalism’s 
inherent tendency to amalgamate, often through technological innovation36 and the 
“credit system.”37 In particular, he described the excesses and dangers that arise 
when accumulated and consolidated private power mutate into centralized private 
power.38 There is no bright line between consolidated and centralized private power. 
As a crude guideline, we might consider all companies within the Standard and 
Poor’s Five Hundred (along with similarly sized, privately held corporations such as 
Cargill and Koch Industries) to be examples of “centralized power” and the 
remaining companies on the major exchanges as illustrations of “concentrated 
private power.”39   
B. Reducing Centralized Power 
The first step is to reduce centralized private power where it seems most 
unnecessary and where it has already threatened the long-term health and viability of 
the nation. Thus, we should first consider the major Wall Street banks. As soon as 
possible, private bankers should be excluded from the Federal Reserve System in 
either ownership or decision-making. Indeed, the Supreme Court ought to hold that 
commingling essential governmental functions such as, control of money supply and 
secret reallocation of great wealth, with centralized private power is an 
unconstitutional delegation of core public legislative and executive authority. The 
second step is to dissolve these vast banks. If they are “too big to fail” and “too big 
to prosecute,” then they are too big to exist. The third step is to institute robust 
antitrust law, sympathetic labor law (both on its face and as applied), a variety of 
                                                           
 34 That is not to say, however, that corporations should have no constitutional rights. For 
example, private media companies, which should not be part of larger conglomerates and 
should have limited market share, need broad First Amendment protections under the Free 
Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses. In addition, private corporations accumulate 
individual, private property interests. Consequently, the government ought not to be able to 
confiscate corporate property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 
 35 See LESSIG, supra note 6, at 96. 
 36 Technology also weakens the working class. “The machine . . . replaces the worker . . . .” 
1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 497 (Ben Fowkes trans., Pelican Books 1990) (1867). 
 37 Id. at 777. 
 38 See id. 
 39 It is important to note that “centralized power” extends beyond legal and cultural 
definitions of “monopoly.” See Lawrence W. Reed & Michael D. LaFaive, Regulation and 
Monopolies, MACKINAC CENTER (Nov. 1, 1997), 
http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=683. 
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increased taxes on high income, wealth, and excessive consumption, and major 
changes in campaign finance law would gradually reduce the plutocracy’s 
disproportionate power.40 For example, Congress could create a “Tobin tax” on all 
spot transactions, thereby raising revenues and undermining predatory high 
frequency trading.41 
Aristotle warned that the rich, not the poor, typically constitute the greatest threat 
to republican stability.42 Some opulent people are more interested in increasing their 
wealth and power than in democracy, the fate of fellow citizens, or the planet. They 
dedicate their lives to accumulating wealth, power, and glory or obtaining inherited 
fortunes that tend to make them spoiled, flaccid, and self-absorbed. It is not enough 
to redistribute some wealth to pacify the poor and declining middle class; we must 
reduce the capacity of a few unaccountable people to oversee so much of our society.  
This problem has increased as the American economy has lost relative economic 
power, now deeply enmeshed in the “global economy.”43 Wealthy individuals from 
all over the world own and run gargantuan private institutions, and some 
international capitalists seem to have little or no concern about the future of the poor 
or middle class in America or anywhere else.  
In addition, conditioning capital flow would probably weaken centralized, global 
private power as much as eliminating Citizens United. Adam Smith’s belief that 
local workers will usually benefit from deregulation and free trade since those 
policies tend to “increase the general industry of the society”44 becomes more 
uncertain when capital, protected by state-subsidized military power, travels across 
the globe to find the most profitable locations in terms of low wages, weak labor 
laws, and minimal regulatory constraints.45 A capitalist no longer has incentives to 
“employ his capital as near home as he can.”46 Thus, another of Smith’s economic 
findings becomes more relevant: Capital creates employment wherever it resides.47 
In a global economy, free trade may promote the overall wealth of the species, but 
not the wealth of many individual nations or many people within nations. Smith 
comes close to conceding that point: “In manufactures, a very small advantage will 
enable foreigners to undersell our own workmen, even in the home-market.”48 Thus, 
                                                           
 40 For an earlier exploration of the constitutional implications of private power, see James 
G. Wilson, Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 439 (1996). 
 41 The “Tobin tax” was first proposed by Nobel Laureate James Tobin in 1972. See James 
Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153, 155 (1978). Tobin’s 
theory would, in essence, impose a small tax (between 0.1% and 1%) to each round-trip 
currency transaction with the hope that the tax would curtail currency speculation and stabilize 
exchange rates. See id.    
 42 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 32, at 2067. 
 43 Paul B. Farell, U.S. Losing Economic War and Asia Loves It, MARKET WATCH.COM 
(June 3, 2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/america-the-quitter-getting-whipped-by-
china-2013-06-01. 
 44 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 615 (Edwin Cannan ed., 5th ed., 2003) (1776). 
 45 See id. at 423-46. 
 46 See id.  
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 481.  
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Smith found more obvious benefits in permitting the importation of cattle or “rude 
produce of the soil” (assuming they can be raised more cheaply abroad) than 
manufactured goods because some “home manufactures would probably suffer, and 
some of them, perhaps, go to ruin altogether, and a consider part of the stock and 
industry at present employed in them would be forced to find some other 
employment.”49 Therefore, conditioning capital flow would likely weaken 
centralized, global private power. Of course, so long as Citizens United exists, it will 
be hard to require corporations to keep some of their manufacturing in the United 
States because the wealthy continue to commit hundreds of millions to congressional 
and presidential elections.  
Obviously, there would be massive resistance to significantly changing the 
current political economy. The rich could crash markets, taking their skills and 
wealth to other nations. Indeed, the value of many companies would decrease. If we 
were not facing so many pressing environmental and social problems, Burkean 
gradualism would be the best way to proceed.  Thus, huge burdens remain on radical 
critics to demonstrate that the existing system has become so corroded that it has 
become dangerously unsustainable and to develop alternatives that protect legitimate 
private interests that create incentives, security, and a counterweight to excessive 
public power.   
II. DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE “RULE OF LAW” 
Without attempting to be comprehensive, this section considers several versions 
of the “rule of law.” Each conception provides some degree of protection to some or 
all of the populace and collapses in different ways. As the “rule of law” definitions 
become more substantive, they become increasingly controversial. 
Some have criticized “the rule of law” as a conservative propaganda ploy that 
helps prop up an illegitimate ideological apparatus that supports oppressive “liberal” 
regimes.50 Others see the phrase as a vacuous, outdated slogan that at best fails to 
describe current reality and at worst impedes executive discretion.51 However, the 
phrase confirms humanity’s desperate need for law to protect basic rights, even if 
human judges inevitably apply law to new facts, interpret the law, and create new 
law, thereby legislating as well as adjudicating.52 For example, five or more Supreme 
Court Justices (men and women, not laws) may eventually decide that the President 
has unlimited power to kill suspected “terrorists” anywhere, but we can hope the 
Court would never permit the President to slaughter political rivals in Congress or 
commit sexual assaults with total impunity. Perhaps the best we can hope for is “the 
rule of law and men.”   
                                                           
 49 Id. 
 50 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 45, 73 
(2004). 
 51 There are amoral radicals who seek to substitute the “rule of politics” for the “rule of 
law.” See ERIC A. POSNER & ADAM VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 12-15 (2010).  
 52 See TAMANAHA, supra note 50, at 102. 
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A. Traditional Positivist Conceptions of the Rule of Law 
We need positivism to understand any legal system. However, positivism cannot 
provide sufficient moral justification by itself, because some legal systems help 
create and perpetuate injustice by having laws that are imposing systemic injustice, 
applying current laws unfairly, creating flawed procedural systems, or combining 
these illegitimate tactics. More profoundly, we need a deeply substantive conception 
of the “rule of law” that protects individuals, the Republic, and the environment. 
The crudest positivist description of the “rule of law” focuses on texts of legal 
rules and doctrines. There is limited “rule of law” in a legal regime that facially 
authorizes slavery and prohibits assault while hypocritically permitting slave owners 
to whip, brand, and rape slaves.53 Women and freed African-Americans were 
generally denied many rights including the right to contract, vote, testify at trials, or 
serve on juries.54 Slavers’ property rights were enhanced by this grotesque system, 
because they had access to legal force while their prey did not.55 In other words, this 
narrow version of positivism enabled some people to obtain whatever benefits the 
legal system provided at the expense of others. Such regimes can be preferable (at 
least for favored citizens) to living in a violently anarchistic “state of nature” or 
under the whims of a tyrant with a gang of minions.  
A broader positivist description of the “rule of law” considers not just the rule’s 
terminology, but also the legal system’s application of those rules: Every person is 
entitled to whatever protection the law actually provides them.56 The American 
system allocates vast discretionary powers to judges, juries, prosecutors, and 
administrative officials. These authorities do not equally enforce all legal texts and 
doctrines. To use constitutional jargon, the laws may be appropriate “on their face,” 
but they often are improperly applied. For example, Southern voter literacy tests 
(which did not mention race) were designed to exclude black voters and immigrant 
workers even though they facially appeared to serve the somewhat more legitimate 
purpose of screening out allegedly unqualified voters.57 The tests as applied were 
discriminatory because voting officials asked more difficult questions to African-
Americans, such as naming all of the state’s county judges, stating the date 
Oklahoma became a state, or determining how many bubbles are in a bar of soap.58  
Thus, a legal system can be horrifically flawed on its face (state-sanctioned 
slavery), facially and as applied (Southern de jure and de facto segregation after the 
Civil War), or as applied (racial disparities that permeate America’s existing 
                                                           
 53 For horrific examples, see THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER & THE AMERICAN ANTI-
SLAVERY SOCIETY, THE SLAVE BOOK—THE DARK SIDE OF AMERICAN SLAVERY: TORTURE AS A 
TOOL OF CONTROL AND AS A FORM OF ENTERTAINMENT (2015). 
 54 Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 
AKRON L. REV. 671, 672 (2003). 
 55 See generally A. Leon Higginbothom, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law Only as an 
Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum 
Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 1045 (1992) (discussing how the assault of a 
slave was not recognized as a criminal offense in the eighteenth century). 
 56 See TAMANAHA, supra note 50, at 99. 
 57 See Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-55 (1959). 
 58 ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 691 (2002). 
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criminal justice system—from the arresting process to sentencing and pardons).59 
These positivist regimes can be so horrific that many of us consider them to be 
unworthy of the appellation: “rule of law.” Thus, it is more accurate to say that there 
have always been varying, inadequate degrees of “rule of law” in America, than to 
argue that these dreadful statutes and bad faith implementations totally eliminated 
the “rule of law.”60   
The problem with these positivist examples is that rulers have unfettered 
discretion to do whatever they want. They can pass odious laws, fail to enforce laws 
they do not like, and/or apply existing laws in bad faith. Any legal theorist who 
defines “rule of law” this narrowly has used the phrase as a purely descriptive 
device. Of course, there is nothing wrong with separating “is” from “ought.” We 
must know how existing law functions before proposing changes. 
Like the Declaration of Independence’s inspiring phrase, “all men are created 
equal,”61 the term “rule of law” can have normative as well as analytical dimensions, 
providing alternatives that show more precisely why current positivist conceptions of 
“rule of law” are grossly inadequate. Professor Lon Fuller argued that any legal 
system must have several procedural characteristics.62 For example, if rulers do not 
promulgate laws, people have no notice of rights and responsibilities.63 Similarly, 
retroactive laws punish those who made a good faith effort to comply with known, 
existing law.64 Inspired by clauses such as prohibition on “ex post facto” laws and 
“impairment of contracts,” the Supreme Court has been appropriately wary of 
retroactive legislation, which reeks of confiscation and retaliation.65  
The positivist conception of the “rule of law” helps describe the current alliance 
between American political branches and corporate capitalism. For example, 
congressional and state tax laws are facially flawed because they disproportionately 
favor the rich. Billionaire hedge fund managers pay a lower tax-rate than their 
secretaries.66 Further, the enforcement of laws, or lack thereof, by the executive 
branches at the state and federal level demonstrate how our laws are flawed both 
facially and in their application. For instance, the executive branches at the state and 
                                                           
 59 See TAMANAHA, supra note 50, at 93, 120. 
 60 See id. at 114. 
 61 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 62 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 24 (2d ed. 1969). 
 63 See Tara Smith, Neutrality Isn’t Neutral: On the Value-Neutrality of the Rule of Law, 4 
WASH. U. JUR. REV. 49, 56 (2011). 
 64 David Luban, The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Reexamining Fuller’s Canons, 2 
HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 29, 29 (2010). 
 65 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (“The Legislature's 
unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without 
individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be 
tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or 
individuals.”). 
 66 See Meredith R. Conway, Money, It’s a Crime. Share it Fairly, But Don’t Take a Slice 
of My Pie!: The Legislative Case for the Progressive Income Tax, 39 J. LEGIS. 119, 170-71 
(2013) (discussing how, with all the tax loopholes, the tax burden imposed on high-income 
taxpayers in reality is much less). 
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federal level do not prosecute pervasive white-collar crime with sufficient vigor, 
while the Supreme Court has simultaneously created innumerable technical obstacles 
to proving investment fraud.67 This results in a system in which a compulsive or 
desperate, petty thief can be imprisoned for life under the “three strikes” rule, but a 
wealthy Wall Street banker has little to fear. In addition, the laws and the judicial 
doctrines are facially flawed by making investment fraud difficult to prove; this 
facial flaw is then exacerbated by the flaw in the application of the laws, mainly that 
federal and state executive branches do not prosecute white collar criminals with the 
same vigor as a common repeat offender. Indeed, the current system, under this 
positivist theory on the “rule of law,” is a sad variant of the famous quip that 
America established “socialism for the rich, capitalism for the poor.”68 Perhaps more 
relevantly, this nation’s legal regime provides “subsidized anarchy for the rich, the 
rule of law against the poor.”  
B. A Blended Positivists Theory on the Rule of Law  
1. As-applied 
The next conception of “the rule of law” blends positivism, which does not 
include a moral assessment of existing rules, with some moral content; state actors 
cannot invidiously discriminate when enforcing extant law. This narrow, substantive 
version of “rule of law” does not facially invalidate any statutes.69 Instead, there 
must be substantive requirements to distinguish between illegal “invidious 
discrimination” and legally “permissible discrimination.”70 Desirable external norms 
can be found in the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, 
and various theories of Natural Law and Natural Rights. This blended approach 
follows the broad contours of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, which requires equal enforcement of existing laws. A court 
usually will not invalidate facially neutral laws but can proscribe application of valid 
rules.71  
Unequal enforcement of existing laws can be profoundly demoralizing and 
divisive. Thus, investors should be protected from fraud as much as consumers, 
purchasers of services, and homeowners. Many years ago, the great legal scholar, 
Henry Maine, explained that one of the primary functions of any legal system was to 
prevent the rich from using fraud to exploit weaker members of society.72 
Subsequent events have consistently confirmed his concern. 
                                                           
 67 E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416 (2014). 
 68 The Daily Show: Interview with Joe Biden, Part 2 (Comedy Central television broadcast 
Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/5dodmo/the-daily-show-with-jon-stewart-joe-
biden-pt--2. 
 69 DAVID DYZENHAUS, RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 155 
(1999). 
 70 TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 258 (2000). 
 71 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“A facial challenge to a 
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the 
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid.”). 
 72 HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF 
SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 15 (10th ed. 2008) (1861). 
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2. Formal Equality 
In order to make the “rule of law” more effective the Court has the power to 
invalidate statutory texts. It usually employs some substantive variant of “formal 
equality,” inferring egalitarian principles from constitutional texts. In McCulloch v. 
Maryland, the Court struck down a Maryland law that taxed the operations of a 
national bank.73 The Maryland voters “targeted” an unpopular institution, gaining 
more in tax revenues than they paid in federal taxes to support the bank.74 Chief 
Justice Marshall stated that Maryland could have assessed a general property tax that 
would have applied to the bank, but the legislators would never Levy such a tax 
because that would injure their voters much more than the national bank.75 Current 
Justices continue to use Marshall’s methodology: laws discriminating either facially 
or in application on the basis of race, gender, religion, ethnicity, speech, and political 
viewpoint are presumptively invalid.76   
The precise dimensions of formal equality remains highly contested. Current 
members of the Court disagree about extending all constitutional rights (including 
marriage) to homosexuals77 or providing higher education admissions preferences to 
under-represented minorities.78 Citizens United is another example: Conservatives 
argue that the First Amendment prohibits discrimination based upon status, i.e., 
private corporations should have the same speech rights as citizens or media 
outlets.79 Of course, constitutional doctrine need not be pushed to its logical extreme. 
Few people consistently push formal equality to its limits: Justices across the 
political spectrum support speech constraints on military officials, government 
employees, private actors, and prisoners.80  
Many legal theorists end their “rule of law” analysis with a version of formal 
equality that invalidates selected laws and actions “on their face” and “as applied.”81 
The conservatives on the Supreme Court usually limit judicial enforcement of 
“Equal Protection” or the Dormant Commerce Clause to statutes that facially violate 
their particular conception of formal equality.82 But healthy republics also require a 
liberty-based conception of the “rule of law,” reinforced by the tyranny-preventing 
doctrine (a mixture of structure, process, and substance) called “separation of 
                                                           
 73 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 399 (1819). 
 74 Id. at 327. 
 75 Id. at 361. 
 76 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
 77 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 78 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003). 
 79 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010). 
 80 See Josh Davis & Josh Rosenberg, Government as Patron or Regulator in the Student 
Speech Cases, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1047, 1053 (2012). 
 81 See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce 
Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 53-54 (2006). 
 82 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding, 5-4, that Commerce 
Clause did not provide Congress the authority to enact civil remedy provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act). 
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
170 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:157 
 
powers.” Personal mobility remains our most important personal freedom: prisoners 
have few rights and less happiness. The Court should closely monitor the executive 
to ensure he or she does not abuse his or her powers, particularly by expanding 
prerogatives when conducting and even fomenting innumerable wars on drugs, 
terrorists, nations, and poor people (usually of color). “Necessity,” now 
characterized as “national security” by the Court, always threatens to undermine 
legality, legitimating allocation of extensive discretionary power to a few powerful 
state actors.83  
In particular, the Supreme Court created a disturbing precedent in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld by refusing to guarantee American citizens, charged with terrorism, their 
full panoply of textually guaranteed constitutional rights.84 Military tribunals, 
overseen by the President as Commander-in-Chief, are no substitute for a trial by 
one’s peers, a substantive and procedural conception of the “rule of law” that can be 
traced back to the Magna Carta.85 We should never forget that centralized state 
power remains a greater threat to republican freedoms and stability than centralized 
private power. This approach merges Fuller’s “proceduralism” with individual 
liberty and autonomy. 
C. A Natural Law Theory on the Rule of Law 
The “rule of law” can also include much broader substantive conceptions of 
“justice,” such as a commitment to environmental viability, individual happiness, 
and creating a sense of community that is not riven by wealth disparity. While 
Justices no longer make “natural law” arguments, natural law-like reasoning 
permeates their analysis.86 “Natural” or “higher” law is open-ended (assuming the 
legal system has remained faithful to the prior rule of law requirements). 
Aristotle believed the appropriate distribution of wealth and power constituted a 
republic’s most important, difficult constitutional question.87 Indeed, he 
distinguished illegitimate democracies, in which the majority seized all the wealth, 
from desirable “constitutional democracies,” in which the majority ruled but did not 
exploit those who obtained additional capital through their talents, good fortune, or 
birth.88 His three “perverse” forms of government—democracy, oligarchy, and 
tyranny—could never be desirable because the leaders pursued their class interests 
                                                           
 83 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (“Our opinion does not undermine 
the Executive's powers as Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those powers 
is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch. Within the Constitution's 
separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as 
necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison 
a person.”). 
 84 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004). It is worth remembering that Justice 
Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote a powerful dissent attempting to preserve the 
Constitution’s many procedural protections provided to citizens. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 85 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968). 
 86 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
 87 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 65 (Peter L. Phillips trans., 1997).   
 88 Id. at 84. 
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instead of the “common good.”89 He explained that the rich were usually the greatest 
threat to the republic; the poor only revolt when they are deeply oppressed. 
Aristotle also argued that laws should be predictable and non-arbitrary, finding 
that the rule of law is superior to the rule of man. Magistrates should be nothing 
more than “guardians and ministers of the law”; for if the law rules, no individual 
rules. He wrote, anyone “who bids the law to rule seems to bid god and intellect 
alone to rule, but anyone who bids a human being to rule adds on also the wild 
beast.”90 He advocated for separation of powers, asserting that lawmakers should be 
separate from the judiciary 
Legal corrosion in America, exacerbated by wealth inequality and imperialism, 
reinforces the discretionary rule of men in the public and private domains. Because 
there are few external constraints, they rule by pleasure instead of constrained 
judgment.  
Most importantly, our species faces extraordinary perils.  Not only do we 
continually risk nuclear war, but we also must address the damage billions of 
humans are doing to their surroundings. From the point of view of most other 
species, humans are the “few” oligarchs and the other species are the vulnerable 
“many.” Robust visions of the “rule of law” and the republics they promotes requires 
the world’s many cultures to change legal and social norms to foster courageous 
kindness that limits excessive greed.    
III. “CORROSION” AND “CORRUPTION” 
Whenever the Supreme Court applies “heightened scrutiny” it follows a few 
Aristotelian techniques, formulated in McCulloch v. Maryland,91 that empower it to 
do pretty much whatever it desires.92 When the Court applies these techniques, it can 
strike down ends it does not like, means it finds repellant, or means it believes are 
poorly designed to serve legitimate ends.93  
                                                           
 89 Id. at 61. 
 90 Id. at 111. 
 91 Incidentally, McCulloch’s pragmatic techniques reveal another oddity in the rhetoric of 
contemporary “conservative” jurisprudence. Some theorists do not want judges to ascertain 
the “purpose” of laws, because that technique generates a consequentialist, “policy”-based 
analysis commingling “law” and “politics.” See Julie Dickson, Interpretation and Coherence 
in Legal Reasoning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/legal-reas-interpret. (revised Feb. 10, 
2010), Yet every Supreme Court Justice interprets constitutional texts to preclude elected 
officials from pursuing certain ends while permitting them to pursue other goals. See 
generally John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (2014). In other words, every constitutional text has a cluster of functions, empowering 
governmental officials and/or constraining them from pursuing certain means and/or ends. 
Justices determine and implement the “purposes” of constitutional texts by second-guessing 
legislative “purposes.” Every “fundamental right” creates costs and benefits, and every 
“compelling state interest” fulfills governmental functions. I admittedly do not have as pure or 
precise a vision of legal reasoning as many contemporary conservatives, but this all sounds 
extraordinarily purposeful and “political.” 
 92 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 93 See, e.g., id. at 436-37. 
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A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
1. Buckley  
The Supreme Court first narrowed congressional power to regulate campaign 
finance in Buckley v. Valeo. The Court stated that that Congress could only regulate 
campaign finance in pursuit of two purposes: (1) the prevention of corruption and/or 
(2) the prevention of the appearance of corruption.94 This winnowing of ends 
enabled the Court to pick and choose among congressional means, upholding direct 
donation limits but voiding limits to personal spending. The Court concluded that 
using its own wealth cannot corrupt a candidate,95 but a candidate can be 
inappropriately influenced by external donations. Whatever the intent of the 
distinction, the effect gave an advantage to wealthy candidates. 
2. Citizens United 
After hemming and hawing about the scope of Buckley, the increasingly 
aggressive majority in Citizens United reduced the meaning of “corruption” to 
bribery.96 There must be an immediate exchange of votes for money or other 
benefits.97 The Court called this a “quid pro quo,” almost the equivalent of a 
contract. There is thus no problem if the vote is made because the politician is all but 
guaranteed a future lucrative job or a sinecure for a family member. Nor are 
politicians’ dependence on future contributions an appropriate legislative concern. 
Because so many Americans believe our political-economic system has become 
profoundly corrupt in the more traditional sense of the word,98 the majority dropped 
“the appearance of corruption.”99  
B. Corruption, Corrosion, and the Rule of Law 
Once again, the Court instructs the populace on how to perceive reality. Many 
years ago, the Court informed African-Americans that they should not have sensed 
any racism in Southern laws precluding them from fully utilizing public 
accommodations and resources; they were simply being paranoid.100 More recently, 
the Court determined there was not sufficient proof that racism polluted public 
contracting in Richmond, Virginia,101 or that racism still infects the electoral process 
in the Southern states.102 Critics do not understand, much less appreciate, the 
wonderful world the Court has helped create. If you fear the executive’s exploding 
                                                           
 94 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976). 
 95 Id. at 53. 
 96 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356-57 (2010). 
 97 See id. at 360 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)). 
 98 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, GALLUP (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-corruption.aspx. 
 99 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
 100 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 101 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989). 
 102 See Shelby Cty. Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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powers, you suffer from “Tyrannophobia”103 or if you think racism and sexism are 
still serious problems, you are “politically correct.” 
One problem with legal doctrine is its tendency to ossify not only legal but also 
political and cultural discourse as well. Once the Court defines a word in a particular 
way, its usage becomes rhetorically privileged, filtering throughout American 
society. For lawyers, such linguistic conformity is understandable: Litigants must 
convince the Court that their position is consistent with pre-existing judicial 
precedent that contains necessarily dogmatic definitions.  
Another major dimension of the “rule of law” is a reasonable amount of 
consistency over time, guaranteeing equal treatment of similarly situated parties.104 
In other words, stare decisis creates common law over time, not just within a 
jurisdiction. Relatively fixed and clear definitions are an essential component of the 
rule of law, not just for notice but also for temporal consistency. But there are costs 
whenever the Court’s doctrinal rhetoric permeates the broader culture. When Justice 
Blackmun claimed a generalized “right of privacy” protected a woman’s right to 
have an abortion in Roe, he pressured advocates and opponents to fit future 
arguments within that awkward terminology.105 From one perspective, there is 
nothing very “private” about a medical procedure. Furthermore, his notion of 
“privacy” tended to emphasize the doctor-patient relationship, not the woman’s 
dilemma. Over time, he shifted, agreeing that the right enabled women to have more 
control over their bodies and destinies.106 The “right to privacy” became “the right to 
choose.” Similarly, Justice Powell in Bakke limited racial affirmative action in 
higher education to achieving “diversity,” ignoring many benefits and costs.107 For 
example, we need a racially mixed office corps to lead armies filled with a large 
number of minority troops. Providing access to the best and brightest of all races 
prevents ghettoization, racial polarization, and demoralization. Some of us believe 
that prior historical racial abuses require remediation. Successful minority leaders 
provide inspiration to youth of all colors. Whatever else he accomplished or failed to 
achieve, President Obama’s two elections made many people of all races feel better 
about their country, giving them long-term hope for a more harmonious racial future. 
Yet, according to Powell, those pragmatic considerations somehow need to be 
reduced to the single, obscure goal of “diversity” at the university level.108 
Thus, one way to analyze case law is to avoid using relevant Supreme Court 
terminology, at least for a while. Here, we simply ask whether our political economy 
has become corroded—less effective at providing opportunities for average citizens, 
more polarized, unstable, ineffective, and obsessed with predation more than 
production. If we infer from the facts that the affluent have gained too much power 
                                                           
 103 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 51, at 204. 
 104 Juan C. Botero & Alejandro Ponce, Measuring the Rule of Law 8 (World Justice 
Project—Working Paper Series, WPS No. 001, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966257. 
 105 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 106 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 107 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978). 
 108 Id. 
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and are collectively abusing that power, we might revisit the word “corruption,” 
concluding that the Court’s definition is too narrow. Or we could even engage in a 
lawyer’s cheap rhetorical move: Congress can purposefully fight corrosion as well as 
corruption (bribery). This maneuver would not totally repudiate the existing juristic 
conception of corruption; it simply consigns that definition to the marginal 
significance it deserves by permitting another Congressional “end.” 
IV. A BRIEF EMPIRICAL DISCUSSION OF HOW PRIVATE CENTRALIZED POWER IS 
UNDERMINING THE RULE OF LAW 
The final section of this Essay presents a small sample of outrageous behaviors 
that the state and federal governments refused to punish by filing criminal 
indictments. These inactions have sent a clear message: The powerfully rich can get 
richer by virtually any form of nonviolent crime. Such abuses of prosecutorial 
discretion mock the President’s textual constitutional responsibility to “faithfully 
execute the law.”109 The “rule of law” is breaking down. 
A. Private Banking 
For years, major international banks catered to illegal drug traders. The Mexican 
branches of HSBC, a gigantic British bank that epitomizes “centralized power,” 
permitted drug dealers to “deposit hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash, in a 
single day, into a single account, using boxes designed to fit the precise dimensions 
of the teller windows.”110 Similarly, Wachovia Bank laundered almost 400 billion 
dollars in drug cartel money.111 The lead federal prosecutor stated: “Wachovia's 
blatant disregard for our banking laws gave international cocaine cartels a virtual 
carte blanche to finance their operations.”112 But, as has almost always been the case, 
no individual bankers were charged, much less convicted, for these criminal 
conspiracies.113 While it is acceptable in society and profitable to large corporations 
to throw teenagers in jail for illegal drug usage and stigmatize them for life with a 
felony conviction in a dreadful job market, federal prosecutors understand that big 
bankers have an “unofficial immunity” precluding personal responsibility for 
facilitating and profiting from this illegal, often deadly business. Subsequently, a 
lawyer at the Justice Department honestly stated that the Department did not want to 
bring personal charges against bankers, because such cases undermine the market’s 
“confidence.”114 In other words, the stock market prefers fraud to honesty, knowing 
                                                           
 109 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 110 Matt Taibbi, Outrageous HSBC Settlement Proves the Drug War is a Joke, ROLLING 
STONE (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/outrageous-hsbc-
settlement-proves-the-drug-war-is-a-joke-20121213 (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney General 
Lanny Breuer). 
 111 Ed Vuovialliamy, How a Big U.S. Bank Laundered Billions From Mexico’s Murderous 
Drug Gangs, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2011), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/03/us-bank-mexico-drug-gangs.  
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer explained why the Justice Department was so 
timid: “Had the U.S. authorities decided to press charges, HSBC would almost certainly have 
lost its banking license in the U.S., the future of the institution would have been under threat, 
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that much of its valuation is premised upon institutionalized deceit. Fraud has 
become a core business model.    
The highly syllogistic, neoclassical economic ideology assumes that markets are 
so wise and responsible that governmental regulation is presumptively unnecessary. 
All external interventions and events interfere with the internal “efficiency” of the 
markets, which somehow always produce the optimal amount of goods and services 
at the lowest price, an outcome that somehow always serves the common good.115 
The market, graced by a providential “Invisible Hand,” is “natural,” while 
government “interventions” are clumsy and counter-productive. Under this view, 
government officials can never plan well, but private bankers are visionaries subject 
only to market discipline (even as they continually work to eliminate 
competition).116 However, there is little discussion of those bankers’ great enabler, 
the Federal Reserve, which constantly rearranges the economy to benefit the banks. 
Examples abound after the 2008 crash, which was caused by a profoundly 
deregulated market system instead of exogenous events. The processing of home 
mortgages was corroded by pervasive fraud, outlandish leverage, recklessness, and 
numerous accounting deceits.117 Many buyers, mortgage sellers, investment banks, 
Fannie Mae, and insurers such as AIG temporarily thrived in the low-interest, 
deregulated environment.118  
B. Subprime Loans 
To make money, investment banks like Citigroup took title to rotten subprime 
loans before turning them into misleading, highly leveraged derivatives. For many 
profitable quarters, Citigroup garnered huge profits after the rating agencies cravenly 
                                                           
and the entire banking system would have been destabilized.” Matt Taibbi, Gangster Bankers: 
Too Big to Jail, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/gangster-bankers-too-big-to-jail-20130214. 
 115 See James Kwak, Incentives and Ideology, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 253, 257 (2014) 
(“What Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, and Tim Geithner have in common is not just that 
all supported policies that were friendly to the financial sector; they also shared an ideology: 
the belief that lightly regulated financial markets are good for the economy.”). 
 116 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xvii (2011), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (“We [Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission] conclude widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved 
devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets. The sentries were not at their 
posts, in no small part due to the widely accepted faith in the self correcting nature of the 
markets and the ability of financial institutions to effectively police themselves.”). 
 117 Id. at xxiii (“We [Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission] conclude collapsing mortgage-
lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of 
contagion and crisis. When housing prices fell and mortgage borrowers defaulted, the lights 
began to dim on Wall Street. This report catalogues the corrosion of mortgage-lending 
standards and the securitization pipeline that transported toxic mortgages from neighborhoods 
across America to investors around the globe.”). 
 118 Id. at 79 (“In the run-up to the crisis, AIG, the largest U.S. insurance company, would 
accumulate a one-half trillion dollar position in credit risk through the OTC market without being 
required to post one dollar’s worth of initial collateral or making any other provision for loss.”). 
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(and profitably) turned its collection of high-risk loans into “AAA” products.119 
Once the housing market started declining, long-term investors balked.120 Citigroup 
was stuck with a growing portfolio of toxic loans and even more dangerous highly 
leveraged derivatives. To continue selling its products, it secretly gave the buyers the 
right to return the investments if dissatisfied.121 To accomplish this and other 
subterfuges, Citigroup created 427 offshore accounts that hid continuing liabilities 
from investors, shareholders, tax collectors, and regulators.122 Many other companies 
engaged in similar deceptive practices.123  
The Obama administration did not indict anyone at Citigroup.124 Although you 
do not hear this claim made very often in liberal circles, the Bush Presidents were 
more faithful to enforcing the “rule of law” than their recent Democratic 
counterparts. After the savings and loan scandal broke in the 1980s, under the first 
Bush administration, hundreds of bankers went to jail.125After the 2008 crash, the 
Obama administration scattered indictments at a few mid-level bankers, generating a 
smidgen of convictions.126 
                                                           
 119 Christina Rexrode, Citigroup Hopes to Finally Close Chapter on Subprime-Lending 
Venture, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-hopes-
to-finally-close-chapter-on-subprime-lending-venture-1412273645 . 
 120 Id. 
 121 Citigroup Announces Agreement to Resolve Certain Private-Label Securitization 
Repurchase Claims, CITIGROUP (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/news/2014/140407b.htm. 
 122 Lynnley Browning, U.S. Subsidiaries in Offshore Tax Havens, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/17/business/17tax.html?_r=0. 
 123 Id. Enron engaged in similar accounting fraud during the second Bush administration; 
its top executives were disgraced, convicted of fraud.  See Thomas S. Mulligan, Enron’s Top 
Executives Are Convicted of Fraud, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2006), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/26/business/fi-enron26. One of George W. Bush’s allies, 
Ken Lay, faced years of imprisonment but died before going to jail. Carrie Johnson, Enron’s 
Lay Dies of Heart Attack, WASH. POST (July 6, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/07/05/AR2006070500523.html. 
 124 Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-
jail-financial-crisis.html?_r=0. 
 125 See Noel Brinkerhoff, Saving and Loan Scandal of ‘80s and ‘90s: 102 High-Level 
Executives Convicted; 2008 Financial Crisis Scandal: 1, ALLGOV (Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/saving-and-loan-scandal-of-80s-and-9…vel-
executives-convicted-2008-ﬁnancial-crisis-scandal-1-140914?news=854255; see also Peter 
Cohan, Today’s Financial Meltdown vs. The 1990s S&L Crisis: Which Was Worse?, DAILY 
FINANCE (July 3, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/07/03/financial-
meltdown-vs-savings-loan-crisis-recession. 
 126 See Two Financial Crises Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle and the Mortgage 
Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/04/14/business/20110414-prosecute.html. 
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When the banks became insolvent during the crash, Congress permitted sloppy 
accounting rules to hide the mess and donated 700 billion dollars.127 That colossal 
amount turned out to be a relative pittance, because the Federal Reserve Board 
secretly provided trillions to large private banks and corporations throughout the 
world.128 When the Federal Reserve’s disturbing violations of basic constitutional 
principles was exposed, Congress and the mass media provided cursory attention.129 
The ultimate losers were investors, taxpayers, and pensioners who are still bailing 
out the banks by loaning the banks their money at artificially low interest rates. One 
might have thought that this crash would have ended the lucrative fairytale of the 
independence of contemporary capitalism from government support. 
C. JP Morgan Chase 
Following the 2008 crash, the megabank, JP Morgan, avoided public scandals 
while continuing to engage in scandalous behavior. In 2010, The New York Times 
described CEO Jamie Diamond as “America’s least-hated banker.”130 Over 
subsequent years, the SEC repeatedly charged and fined JP Morgan for violating the 
law.131 Although penalties ranged from the hundreds of millions to the billions, those 
sanctions had little effect on the bank’s bottom line or its fraudulent business 
practices as it continued increasing market share after many of its rivals collapsed 
during the crash.132 These civil penalties were another shell game, regulatory tribute 
posing as deterrence. Indeed, for many years, powerful corporate defendants never 
had to admit wrongdoing (thereby reducing the possibility of shareholder litigation 
and failing to provide the populace with information about the government’s lax 
supervision of venal practices by concentrated private power). Despite such 
consistently lawless behavior, the federal government continues to subsidize the 
major investment banks in numerous ways since the 2008 crash. Like every other 
                                                           
 127 See David M. Herszenhorn, Congress Approves $700 Billion Wall Street Bailout, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/worldbusiness/03iht-
bailout.4.16679355.html?pagewanted=all. 
 128 See Tracey Greenstein, The Fed’s $16 Trillion Bailouts Under-Reported, FORBES (Sept. 
20, 2011, 1:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/traceygreenstein/2011/09/20/the-feds-16-
trillion-bailouts-under-reported. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Roger Lowenstein, Jamie Dimon: America’s Least-Hated Banker, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/magazine/05Dimon-t.html. 
 131 Jared Cummans, JP Morgan’s Fines To Date: A Brief History (JPM), DIVIDEND UNIV. 
(Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.dividend.com/dividend-education/a-brief-history-of-jp-morgans-
massive-fines-jpm. 
 132 See Peter Evans, Steep Penalties Taken in Stride by JPMorgan Chase, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
7, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/steep-penalties-taken-in-stride-by-
jpmorgan-chase. 
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major corporation, JP Morgan paid its fines with taxpayer money.133 Corporations 
were even permitted to deduct some of the fines from their taxes.134   
Separation of powers, the “rule of law,” transparency, and accountability were 
summarily discarded when JP Morgan’s “least-hated banker” lobbied the federal 
government to settle a case out of court for billions of dollars. A non-profit group 
sued the federal government for bypassing the legal system (a procedural violation 
of the rule of law similar to those Fuller described), but the judge threw the case out 
for lack of “standing.”135  
Periodically, the Obama administration talked a bit tougher. But when the Justice 
Department determined that JP Morgan had deceptively marketed many mortgage 
products before the crash, it settled with the bank for thirteen billion dollars without 
even filing a complaint in court.136 Previously, serious judicial oversight sometimes 
caused problems: United States District Court Judge Rakoff continually harangued 
the SEC for its docility before he was undercut by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.137 In early 2016, Goldman Sachs paid a multibillion-dollar fine for 
violating the law in relation to its mortgage security business before the 2008 
collapse; once again, nobody was indicted.138  
D. Corrosion and the Emergence of Crony, Corporate Welfare  
Conservative libertarians often use the phrase “crony capitalism” to describe the 
current political economy, while more left-leaning critics prefer “corporate 
welfare.”139 Perhaps the best phrase is “crony, corporate welfare,” a phrase that 
captures the interweaving of powerful, connected individuals, centralized private 
corporations, and governments.  
Few Americans have been better cronies than Jon Corzine. After making millions 
helping transform Goldman Sachs into a far more predatory trading institution that 
                                                           
 133 Matt Taibbi, The $9 Billion Witness: Meet JPMorgan Chase’s Worst Nightmare, 
ROLLING STONE (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-9-billion-
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 134 Patricia Cohen, When Company is Fined, Taxpayers Often Share Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/business/when-a-company-is-fined-taxpayers-
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 135 See Better Markets, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 83 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 136 See Devlin Barrett & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan, U.S. Settle for $13 Billion, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2013, 6:05 PM), 
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 137 Ben Protess, Judge Rakoff Says 2011 S.E.C. Deal With Citigroup Can Close, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/after-long-fight-
judge-rakoff-reluctantly-approves-citigroup-deal. 
 138 Matthew Goldstein, Goldman to Pay Up to $5 Billion to Settle Claims of Faulty 
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/business/dealbook/goldman-to-pay-5-billion-to-settle-
claims-of-faulty-mortgages.html. 
 139 E.g., Corporate Welfare and the Crony Capitalism That Enriches the Rich, CORP. 
CRIME REP. (July 17, 2015, 5:27 AM), 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/corporate-welfare-and-the-crony-
capitalism-that-enriches-the-rich. 
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relied upon extracting wealth by sneakily trading with “counterparties” instead of an 
investment bank providing needed capital to business “clients,” Corzine became the 
Democratic Senator of New Jersey.140 After his stint in politics, Corzine became 
CEO of the trading firm MF Global.141 Like so many other titans of industry, 
Corzine was paid extravagantly by the board of directors for his alleged expertise 
and connections.142 Initially, the connections paid off; Corzine convinced the New 
York Federal Reserve to make MF Global a “primary dealer.”143 
Corzine’s greed was unbounded. After the 2008 crash, Congress made some 
efforts to reduce financial companies’ leverage. Corzine avoided those constraints by 
setting up an office in London, which had even weaker regulations, to buy European 
government bonds at a forty to one debt to equity ratio.144 When the market moved 
against him, his firm illegally engaged in “re-hypothecation” of clients’ accounts. In 
this context, re-hypothecatoin is a Wall Street euphemism for “theft.”145 After these 
activities became public, Corzine claimed to be totally ignorant of his company’s 
basic operations.146 His defense was he did not “intend” to break the law:147 more 
likely, he did not “intend” to be caught.   
                                                           
 140 Ross Kaminsky, The Collapse of Jon Corzine, AM. SPECTATOR, Feb. 2012, 
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Feb. 2012, http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2012/02/jon-corzine-201202. 
 142 See Matthew Leising & Cristina Alesci, Corzine Resigns from MF Global Four Days 
After Bankruptcy Filing, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 4, 2011, 12:39 PM), 
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 143 Suzanne McGee, Jon Corzine: Sorry Just Doesn’t Cut It, FISCAL TIMES, (Dec. 9. 2011), 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/12/09/Jon-Corzine-Sorry-Just-Doesnt-Cut-It. 
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http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/02/primary-dealers. The dealers profitably redistribute that 
money to favored clients and a myriad other institutions. Id. 
 144 Miles Weiss, Cristina Alesci & Matt Leising, Corzine Pushed Europe Bet to $11.5 
Billion as Board Balked, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 29, 2011, 1:21 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-29/corzine-pushed-fatal-europe-bet-to-11-
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 145 Janet Tavakoli, Rehypothecation is an Old Story: MF Global’s Story is a Different Story 
of Filched Funds, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15, 2012, 5:12 AM), 
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 147 Silla Brush & Lorraine Woellert, Corzine Testifies He Didn’t “Intend to Break Rules on 
Funds, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-
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Although many high-ranking MF executives testified about seemingly criminal 
behavior, nobody was indicted.148 Subsequently, Corzine raised more than five 
hundred thousand dollars for President Obama’s 2012 presidential campaign.149 
When this kickback was exposed, the Obama operatives removed Corzine as a 
“bundler” but kept the money.150 There were no professional ramifications for 
Corzine; he considered launching a hedge fund in 2015.151 
These few examples are not even the tip of the iceberg. Just as high-ranking 
American government officials have not been incarcerated for committing numerous 
war crimes in the Middle East, such as systemic torture in Abu Ghraib and 
elsewhere, leading executives of large corporations (centralized capital) now have an 
unwritten, unofficial immunity from criminal prosecution. General Motors can 
knowingly sell dangerous cars that kill 174 people, only to be slapped on the wrist 
with a 900 million dollar fine that only hurts stockholders.152 Coal companies dump 
toxins in rivers, and BP turned the Gulf of Mexico into a chemical cesspool.153 Truck 
stops fraudulently gouge customers.154 And gigantic Wall Street investment banks 
and other financial organizations, supported by trillions in off-shore money as well 
as all government central banks, continue their crime spree: fixing Libor rates, 
manipulating energy markets, committing fraud during mortgage foreclosures, 
engaging in high frequency trading that strips value from ultimate purchasers, 
facilitating Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, gouging consumers, selling shoddy 
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“financial innovations,” and constantly lobbying to revive the excessively libertarian 
“shadow banking system” that crippled the global economy in 2008.155 JP Morgan 
has relentlessly violated federal laws, concluding that lawlessness and fraud are 
excellent business models, because immediate profits and bonuses dwarf any 
possible future penalties assessed to shareholders should the fraud ever be 
discovered.   
By its very nature, financial fraud is difficult to discover, much less prove in 
court.156 Who knows how many other sleazy deals have been successfully completed 
but never exposed? We will get another glimpse of the extent of market corrosion 
after the next crash. In other words, legal, political and market corrosion feed on 
each other, leading to social corrosion as all the new wealth goes to financial 
hustling instead of production, savings, and consumption.    
These tawdry tales, which could be multiplied ad nauseam, do not logically 
“prove” that centralized power can undermine the rule of law. However, they are 
sufficiently widespread and troubling. They support the claims that the current 
political/legal economy facially discriminates (too many tax breaks for the uber-
wealthy), distributes massive benefits to the rich, enforces the criminal law against 
the poor but not the ruling class, degrades basic procedures, transparency norms, and 
separation of power principles by eliminating judicial oversight over gigantic 
settlements, and is helping create a society wastes too many resources. Just as 
Aristotle warned, wealth and income inequality are threats to humane, stable 
republics.  
CONCLUSION 
One defense of the legal coddling of these moneylords is that they generate most 
of the nation’s wealth. Some of that wealth “trickles down” to average people, who 
allegedly provide little value to the economy.  In other words, a hierarchical “capital 
theory of value” replaces Marx’s “labor theory of value,” two simplistic polarities 
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that deny an obvious reality: Modern economies require capital and labor. Both 
provide value. Admittedly, there is no way to prove that the American economy 
would be stronger if the rich had not become so powerful over the past few decades. 
Perhaps this alleged economic boon justifies maiming the “rule of law” and its 
supporting memes, such as separation of powers, reducing the appearance of 
corruption, and a common-law system equally applicable to all.   
The charts from this Essay’s Introduction show the opposite conclusion: 
profound wealth inequality tends to accelerate, crippling the middle class. Even a 
cursory, comparative look at the current American system reveals a nation that has 
become a playground for the rich. The hotel magnate Leona Helmsley was a 
visionary when she allegedly complained after being convicted for tax evasion: 
“[o]nly the little people pay taxes.”157 In 2011, an enterprising New York Times 
reporter confirmed her observation by comparing the tax rates of janitors, security 
guards, and average residents in the Helmsley Building:158 
Instead of providing easy access to higher education, young adults are burdened 
with over a trillion dollars in non-dischargeable student loans.159 Most young people, 
even with college degrees, find it hard to get decent jobs with reasonable benefits.  
Upward mobility is among the lowest in the developed world.160 Economic disparity 
is among the highest.161 While there has been a partial “recovery,” more than half the 
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nation’s populace continues to live in a depression-like situation. The seeming low 
unemployment rate is profoundly and deliberately misleading: labor work force 
participation rate has dropped by four percent over the past twenty years.162 
Meanwhile, trillions continually flow to large international banks. In the meantime, 
the average American reads less, withdrawing from their political world, degraded 
by relentlessly tawdry political advertisements, into a self-deluded world of 
entertainment and addictions. Such widespread despair is another symptom of 
corrosion. “Demoralization” can be read literally: a person abandons or loses 
personal and political morality.   
Consider the rather lengthy quote by James Madison, made at the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention, that included a warning as well as a ray of hope—whatever 
the fate of Citizens United:  
I consider it reasonable to conclude, that [the legislators] will as readily 
do their duty, as deviate from it: Nor do I go on the grounds mentioned by 
gentlemen on the other side—that we are to place unlimited confidence in 
them, and expect nothing but the most exalted integrity and sublime 
virtue. But I go on this great republican principle, that the people will 
have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there 
no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No 
theoretical checks--no form of government can render us secure. To 
suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness 
without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. If there be sufficient 
virtue and intelligence in the community, it will be exercised in the 
selection of these men. So that we do not depend on their virtue, or put 
confidence in our rulers, but in the people who are to choose them.163 
Hope for profound change is no longer a dream residing far outside the 
“mainstream.”  At the time this Essay was written, the electorate was seriously 
considering these problems for the first time. Unlike Barrack Obama, who raised 
millions from financiers to fund his election, Hillary Clinton faces widespread 
criticism for raising vast amounts of money from Wall Street and for being paid over 
two hundred thousand dollars per speech to talk to financiers like Goldman Sachs. 
Bill and Hillary Clinton have received a total of $153 million in speaking fees since 
Bill was President.164 Many voters support Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump 
because they are tired of crony, welfare capitalism.165 Whatever the media and 
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Supreme Court may say, tens of millions of citizens believe that centralized capital 
has gained effective control of state and federal governments, enabling this narrow 
faction to create two legal systems, one for the poor and middle class, the other for 
the rich. 
28http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/6
